1. Introduction {#s0005}
===============

The housing and socioeconomic conditions of many Roma [1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} communities across the globe can be categorised as substandard (cf. [@b0040], [@b0050], [@b0200], [@b0250], [@b0290]). However, in recent years Roma have managed to improve their living conditions through their own initiatives ([@b0075], [@b0110], [@b0315]). These initiatives often rely on migratory practices, and increased Roma mobility is preoccupying politicians. In various places across the globe, securitisation policies seek to distinguish "between members and unacceptable residents of the territory" ([@b0095]). In the EU, this has been extended to "Roma mobility". Eastern European Roma are, among other matters, blamed for misusing Western European social services and engaging in criminal activities ([@b0080], [@b0335]). This harsh discourse necessitates nuance, as many of the migratory earning strategies actually unmake precarity.

In two cases, I examine what Roma mobility has actually brought about. In doing this, this paper thus seeks to (1) examine local Roma-led housing and earning strategies and (2) compare two outcomes of these strategies in two very different geographical contexts. This research thereby contributes to a growing body of literature that studies and deconstructs locally organised Roma mobile earning and housing strategies (Lancione, 2019; [@b0195], [@b0200], [@b0315]) in a period of neoliberal reforms, soaring populism and xenophobia, and global governance of migration ([@b0165], [@b0330], [@b0365]). However, unlike recent studies of Roma mobility, I do not draw on migrant perspectives from solely European cases. I, instead, present the housing careers and earning strategies of communities in both a European case, i.e., the Romanian Rudar or Boyash, and a South American case, i.e. an Argentinean Romanian-speaking Boyash Roma community, the Ludar. Therefore this study seeks to inform wider relational processes (home-making and socioeconomic mobility) through "experimental comparison" ([@b0055], [@b0130], [@b0185]). The two cases prove to be an insightful starting point for experimental comparative studies on how household economies adapt and how exclusion can be "unmade" from within. Such experimental comparison is not meant to reduce differences. It rather seeks to highlight the heterogeneity of common urban and spatial processes ([@b0055], [@b0130], [@b0175]), and, in the Roma case, of racialised, yet highly mobile, groups, that manage to improve their living conditions.

In studying these cases, I embrace evident differences while looking for resonances. This is, essentially, an acceptance and grounding of heterogeneity in global practices. In this attempt, I proceed by analysing and comparing three key determinants of local economic and housing practices.

The first analysed determinant is the role of the state in both countries. Romania and Argentina are homeownership societies, with 96.8 [2](#fn2){ref-type="fn"} and 68.9 [3](#fn3){ref-type="fn"} per cent, respectively, of their housing stocks being owner occupied. Public housing, state-funded maintenance or modernisation programmes play a marginal role and function poorly in these countries. For lower-income groups, this means that their housing efforts are often relegated to marginal areas, where land is cheaper and/or informal construction is tolerated. However, such marginalisation is also shaped by the particular experiences of racialisation of the two Roma groups.

The second element is mobility. In relation to this, I present literature on the recent populist [4](#fn4){ref-type="fn"} securitisation policies, that pose a threat to mobile Roma groups through "internal borders". The heavily protected external borders of the European Union (EU) are an example of securitisation. However, the recent westward movement of poor and "futureless" Eastern Europeans is likewise framed by many politicians as a serious "security issue" and followed up by restrictions ([@b0340], [@b0330], [@b0365]). In Argentina, Mauricio Macri's 2015 election as president marked the onset of renewed populist and xenophobic migration policies. The most obvious outcome was the rolling back of one of the most progressive migration policies in the world, as the Argentine state sought to "regain" control over its territories and, without evidence, associated "uncontrolled immigration" with shantytown construction, drug abuse, and street vending ([@b0120]). This new political climate potentially also affects the migratory Ludar, who thrive from street vending. It remains to be seen whether Fernández's new progressive administration (since December 2019) will undo Macri's drastic interventions. Currently, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, movements have been only further restricted.

Third, the analysis proceeds to the house- and home-making strategies of two highly mobile, homeowning Roma groups. Their common denominator is the attempt to resist housing precarity, prejudices, and repressive securitisation policies (i.e., racialisation) by continuously adjusting their livelihood strategies. The case of the Ludar presents housing and earning strategies that have been in place for decades. The Rudari in Romania provide an unusual case of homelessness abroad (in Sweden) that facilitates housing improvements at home (in Romania).

I proceed by first introducing what in recent years has been labelled as experimental comparison. Then I move on to discussing the Argentine and Romanian housing markets and theory on securitisation. Subsequently, after presenting the methods, I analyse the housing and earning strategies. The article concludes by reflecting on the inventive earning strategies that seem vital in contexts in which homeownership is enforced because top--down affordable housing provision is neither realised nor considered, xenophobia is on the rise, and movements of people are restricted. Comparing and exposing these local housing practices responds to the call of [@b0170], [@b0130] for newly formulated resisting agency emerging from impoverished and marginal propositions, and succeeding in challenging precarity and societal rejection.

2. Comparing different cases experimentally {#s0010}
===========================================

In recent debates, several scholars have expressed their critique on the reproduction of 'usual theoretical insights' in comparative urban studies ([@b0210], [@b0185], [@b0055]). These studies look 'for the representative, typical, similar, or repetitive' ([@b0055]), are largely conceived around Western concepts, and, arguably, leave many of the contemporary urban and housing developments undertheorised. Studies on gentrification or urban redevelopment in the Global South might be needed, yet the question arises whether these concepts are not excluding many of the spaces where most of urbanisation actually takes place. [@b0055], [@b0130] do argue so, and they insist on the alternative of comparing under-researched places empirically and informing by broad concepts. These concepts, such as homemaking, autoconstruction or peripheral urbanisation are thereby enriched by grounded practices.

This destabilisation of knowledge and theory is an effort to both reveal resonances and expose differential patterns in urban developments across the globe ([@b0130], [@b0215]). Grounded studies are, in that way, not reduced to overarching concepts but a methodological approach to learn from differences. Choosing radically different contexts for comparison is, thus, in the first place experimental, because they have 'seemingly little in common' ([@b0185]. 2404). The suburbs of Buenos Aires and segregated mountain villages in Vâlcea County are certainly different places. The Ludar live under the smoke of Buenos Aires, a cultural and financial hub in South America. The Rudari, instead, live at some 250 km from Bucharest and are surrounded by woods. And still, as I will argue, the housing production and economic activities do demonstrate an agency that finds resonance among and with many other parts of the world.

This resonance is primarily expressed through the relation between informal economic activities and the role of the state, on the one hand, and the peripheral and unequal urban production, on the other ([@b0055]). However, the experimental comparison in the present study also enriches this relation with the struggle against racialisation that these Romanian and Argetinean Roma groups are facing. In the following theoretical sections, I will, therefore, set out the larger institutional structures and specificities in which these two groups live and operate. I will contextualise the housing regimes in both countries and the recent surge of securitisation of unwanted movements.

2.1. The restructured housing regimes of Argentina and Romania {#s0015}
--------------------------------------------------------------

The stories from the Ludar and Rudari have retrenchment of state funding for housing construction and renovation schemes in common. Both countries struggle with staggering housing shortages and decayed housing estates. As a result, millions of Argentineans and Romanians live in overcrowded, multi-generational households or are forced to reside in rapidly constructed slum areas. However, plans for increased public housing prove futile. Obviously, the housing histories of both countries are important but the point of this section is to determine why 'in the face of a state that cannot or will not provide' ([@b0130]) informal and self-constructed housing has become an important form in both countries.

In the last three decades, the housing policies in both countries have been shaped by deep financial crises, subsequent agreements with international financial institutions, and ultimately steep economic recoveries. Romania privatised most of its socialist-era public housing stock in the 1990s and discontinued its social housing provision almost entirely ([@b0015], [@b0300]). Argentina also drastically cut back on social and public housing provision in the 1990 s ([@b0345], [@b0375]). Mass privatisation, rent deregulation, and disinvestment in public and social housing proved further deathblows for the inclusiveness of Romanian ([@b0015], [@b0070], [@b0240], [@b9000]) and Argentine cities ([@b0230], [@b0225], [@b0275], [@b0345]).

The parallels between the countries continue with the establishment of ineffective public housing agencies after the initial deregulation and privatisation of the 1990s (see, e.g., [@b0300], [@b0015]). Prior to deregulation, the socialist Romanian state had an omnipresent role in housing construction, and nearly 40% of the housing stock was public housing by 1989. In addition, another 40% of the housing stock was state-funded housing and sold at capped prices ([@b0205]). After the first postsocialist decade, when 99% of all public housing was privatised overnight, the National Housing Agency (ANL) was created in 1998 to increase the number of affordable housing units.

In Argentina, deregulation was largely initiated by then President Carlos Menem (1989--1999) ([@b0115]). Before the deregulation, state-funded housing amounted to roughly 10% of the total stock. The public housing programme was, nonetheless, underfunded and unsustainable. Public housing was primarily offered through state-funded and long-term loans that, due to cyclical devaluations, were practically offered at giveaway prices that could not sustain ongoing mass production ([@b0005]). Much more important for low-income groups were the legalisation programmes for cheaply acquired vacant lots in peripheral and underdeveloped areas, the *loteos populares*. These lots were subsequently provided with minimal infrastructure ([@b0085], [@b0345]). In that way, the vast majority of lower-income groups could live in legally produced housing. Unsurprisingly, the *loteos populares* comprise the largest part of the housing stock in the Greater Buenos Aires Region (GBAR). However, support for *loteos populares* was gradually discontinued starting in the 1990s ([@b0345]). The Argentine equivalent of the ANL is the Federal Housing Plan (FHP). This programme was adopted immediately after the 2001 crisis when Argentina embarked on more progressive measures to fight poverty ([@b0085]). However, the severe erosion of welfare provision and state institutions in the 1990s proved insurmountable in both Romania and Argentina, while the global financial crisis of 2008 signified the early abandonment of the two optimistic housing policies.

At first sight, the ANL and FHP housing plans seem more like neo-Keynesian strategies not in line with welfare retrenchment. However, the outcomes of these programmes suggest reduced capacities to actively intervene in the housing crises and clarify the continuation of slum construction and illegal rental markets in both countries ([@b9000], [@b0345], [@b0355], [@b0360]). To start with the ANL in Romania, budgetary deficits and a poorly functioning organisation have made the ANL a failure in terms of output figures ([@b0015]; [@b0325]). In the period since the establishment of the ANL (1998), large-scale evictions could not be averted ([@b0150], [@b0180], [@b0175], [@b0060]). In Argentina, the FHP failed to meet expectations to revive the construction of public housing: after minor successes in its first years, construction figures stayed far below the projected 420,000 new housing units ([@b0085], [@b0230]) -- an insufficient number in any case. Instead, privately financed real estate booms took place in the 2000s after the Romanian and Argentine economy quickly recovered. In Argentina, the vast majority of private development was financed by private equity or institutional developers ([@b0020], [@b0305]), while in Romania even securitised mortgages started to be offered after 2005 ([@b0205]). For lower-income families, these developments were often unaffordable so the housing crisis only deepened.

2.2. Securitisation: The re-emergence of populism and societal rejection of "irregular" mobilities {#s0020}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following subsection provides an overview of European and Argentine politics of intra-national and local rebordering that seek to control "irregular" flows of people. The particularity of these borderscapes is that they are outcomes of a securitisation process that -- in line with Huub [@b0330] interpretation -- seeks to prevent the migration of unwanted people that are legal, racialised and whose presence in certain spaces is seen with suspicion and fear. Borders, as [@b9005] or [@b9010] argue, have multiplied in forms and they channel everyday life and determine transgressive usage of space. Aspirations of impoverished residents are limited and around these borders cat-and-mouse geographies emerge ([@b0220]). These geographies are based on rumours and local knowledge, which are shared among vendors, beggars, and other "transgressors" in order to cope with repression. Also in Romania and Argentina many impoverished people operate in these 'grey spaces' of the economy. In this study, these grey spaces are due to migratory strategies far from home; basically, wherever the two communities find opportunities. It is therefore important to establish what recent limitations (borders) appeared in the contexts where my respondents operate as legal and yet unwanted visitors.

### 2.2.1. Governing mobile Eastern European Roma {#s0025}

The migratory practices of the Roma are currently constructed in dominant discourses as a European problem, and emerging scholarship (e.g., [@b0165], [@b0260], [@b0315], [@b0330]) is studying how migratory Roma groups are governed as legal "irregulars". This governance is carried out in various ways and at various scales within the EU.

First, [@b0330] pointed out that "receiving" Western EU states "re-racialised" the Roma as irregular migrants by two practices. On the one hand, *right of residence* is an institutional instrument that can keep undesired "fortune seekers" outside social welfare systems. Although poor Roma can enter richer European countries, to register for right of residence they need to have a job or prove that they are related to someone already residing in the country in question ([@b0125], [@b0135], [@b0315]). Second, various countries have embarked on the deportation of "overstaying" EU migrants ([@b0330]).

The second form of bordering concerns the (ad-hoc) responses to migratory Eastern European Roma at the local level in Western countries -- "everyday bordering" ([@b0370]). The logics of local policies are often responses to the electorate who, supposedly, call for slum- and begging-free municipalities ([@b0195]; [@b0200] [@b0190], [@b0315]). Even though countries such as the UK, Sweden, and Finland have yet to adopt explicit national anti-panhandling laws, local attempts seek to discourage migrating Roma from coming primarily by targeting the negative "by-products" of begging ([@b0315], [@b0200]). These politics of discouragement can be recognised in demolitions of illegal shelters, reduced funding for existing local welfare services, or the removal of personal belongings from sidewalks. Also "active" or "aggressive" begging is policed against in an increasing number of cities. In Sweden and Finland, public health arguments are invoked to justify slum clearances ([@b0190]; [@b0315]).

Third, in the home countries of migrants, "re-bordering" takes place. [@b0035] argued that, in Romania, local and international NGO initiatives have proven more effective at combating poverty and housing precarity than have initiatives undertaken by public authorities. In fact, several local governments have even aggravated exclusion by EU-financed employment programmes in which Roma work under minimum wage or in remote and segregated areas ([@b0330], [@b0040]).

### 2.2.2. Governing irregular movements into and within Argentina {#s0030}

In the case of Argentina, one does not find grand discourses on the Roma and the containment of mobile Roma, so the racialisation of the Roma in Argentina differs from that experienced by the Roma in Romania. However, the Roma of Argentina, estimated to be around 300,000 or 0.7% of the population ([@b0285]), are still considered the most "rejected group in Argentina" [5](#fn5){ref-type="fn"} by the National Institute against Discrimination, Racism, and Xenophobia ([@b0140]). [6](#fn6){ref-type="fn"} What is currently more evident is the return of calls for more secure frontiers and restricted internal mobility, which, as will be shown in this section, can also affect the informal economies in Argentina that are vital to the Ludar. Increased calls for securitisation coincide with Mauricio Macri's election as mayor of Buenos Aires in 2007 and as president of the country in 2015. During his time as mayor, he promised to return order to the "chaotic city" by actively policing informal recyclers, street vendors, and valet boys ([@b0255]). After 2015, he promised to bring this order to the entire country and brought an end "to one of the most progressive immigration policies in the world" ([@b0120]), in place since 2003. The 2003 immigration law was increasingly blamed by its detractors for bringing criminal elements into the country and causing disorder in public spaces ([@b0025], [@b0100]). In the remainder of this section, I consider how bordering is being enacted in Argentina.

First, one can identify the historical bordering. The country has a peculiar history as concerns migration and racialised securitisation attempts. In the 19th century, Argentina adopted a Europe-focused and eugenic-inspired immigration policy called "National Organisation" (Organización Nacional), implemented simultaneously with an ongoing genocide of indigenous people in the interior of the country during the "conquest of the desert" (cf. [@b0030]). This policy became legally binding in 1853 and initially concerned Northern European ethnicities and a priori excluded immigration from neighbouring countries ([@b0025], [@b0120], [@b0160]). Moreover, immigration restrictions starting in 1914 specifically targeted the Roma, forbidding "begging Roma" to enter the country. This restriction presumably did not stop any European Roma from entering the country, as it was practically impossible to enforce ([@b0090]), though it did show that the racialised image of the Roma had crossed the Atlantic. The law was abolished in 1994, but in prior decades, millions of European immigrants had settled in the country, whereas large numbers of immigrants from neighbouring countries were deported and "darker Argentineans" from the interior were evicted from illegal settlements in Buenos Aires ([@b0025]).

The obsession with societal "Europeanness" has arguably moderated in the past three decades. With the election of Macri, however, a renewed focus on the border and migration has emerged and in recent official discourses, deportations and the reaffirmation of borders are repeatedly called for. So, second, a contemporary process of national bordering is seeking to protect "what is left of Argentine society" from an invasion of poor immigrants ([@b0120]). The borders to the North (with Bolivia and Paraguay) are blamed for being porous and allowing delinquents and drugs to enter the country. [7](#fn7){ref-type="fn"} Concurrently, new legislation had been adopted to make deportations easier. [8](#fn8){ref-type="fn"} While all this has no direct impact on the Ludar, who are Argentine citizens, the resulting level of bordering certainly does.

Because third, in accordance with the above, practices of daily bordering are reappearing targeted at "all those irregulars" that already came in. Renewed strong political support exists for urban populist policies and this cannot be understood in isolation from the repressive construction of Argentine society ([@b0100], [@b0255]). According to local officials in larger Argentine cities, public spaces need to be "re-represented" through orderly images of paved sidewalks, gentrified neighbourhoods, and clean parks. As a result, new and harsher urban politics are threatening the position of delegitimised users (e.g., street vendors, waste recyclers, homeless, and slum dwellers) of public space in Argentina ([@b0100], [@b0235], [@b0255]). Street vending and other delegitimised professions are a widespread phenomenon in Argentina and carried out on trains, in tourist areas, and on busy streets. In central Buenos Aires, it offers daily income to at least 10,000 workers and their families. [9](#fn9){ref-type="fn"}

3. The study: methods and contexts {#s0035}
==================================

This article draws on three fieldwork campaigns. In the first (January--March 2016), I conducted 11 interviews with 15 Romanian Roma beggars in the streets of the Swedish city of Uppsala. Of these, 8 were male and 7 female respondents; 13 were homeowners in Romania, and 2 lived as tenants there. In Uppsala, only 3 lived in the homeless shelter. Most of the interviewees (12 out of 15) stated they were Rudari and originated from Vâlcea County, and all resided near the River Olt. All 12 Rudari interviewees were homeowners. The interviews were semi-structured and focused on four themes: housing conditions in Romania, housing conditions in Sweden, migration practices, and labour activities.

In the second fieldwork campaign (May 2016 and March 2018), I travelled to five home villages of the Rudari (see [Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"} , left): 1. the Rudari neighbourhood on a hill near Lunca, 2. Valea lui Stan, 3. an unnamed Rudari village [10](#fn10){ref-type="fn"} north of Tuțulești, 4. Valea Urii (near Căineni Mari), and 5. Cornetu (a Rudari settlement near Copăceni). In these five settlements, all residents were Rudari. At the county level, Roma comprise just below 2% (2011 census) of the population. In Lunca, I met one of my respondents (Tiberius) from Uppsala who acted as a gatekeeper. With Tiberius' help, I managed to carry out 78 structured household interviews with some survey elements in them. These interviews lasted up to 30 min and were documented in extensive notes. The questions focused on migration to Sweden, quality of housing, and recent investments in housing.Fig. 1Left: Rudari villages in Vâlcea County. Right: Moreno and La Perla within GBAR (source: map is an original by author).

The third fieldwork campaign, the study of the Ludar, followed in May--August 2018. After meeting Jorge Nedich, a Ludar--Argentine novelist, I learned of the existence of several concentrated Romanian-speaking Ludar communities in GBAR. Jorge gave me phone numbers of other Ludar, and I managed to contact two Ludar families. The first lived in the Ludar community of Moreno (in the Puente Cascallares neighbourhood) and the second in La Perla neighbourhood, on the border between the *partidos* of Almirante Brown and Lomas de Zamora (see [Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"}, right). These two initial respondents helped in maximising my points of entry to other families. The snowball sampling method was subsequently used to make contact with as many Ludar as possible.

I interviewed a total of ten Ludar households in La Perla and five in Moreno, totalling 20 actively participating interviewees: 11 were men and 9 females, all were homeowners and aged between 38 and 82. All these interviews were held in Romanian, while sufficient knowledge of Spanish helped me substitute words the Ludar did not understand from modern Romanian. The interviews lasted between one and three hours and were interrupted by generous lunches and counter-questions about Romania, a world to which they could only vaguely relate. Some were even unaware that they spoke Romanian and thought that their language, Ludărește, [11](#fn11){ref-type="fn"} was spoken solely by them. These interviews focused on themes concerning housing trajectories and investments, economic activities, and community strategies.

4. The struggle to be housed in a place called home {#s0040}
===================================================

This section focuses on local housing and livelihood strategies developed in recent decades. First, these cases provide an overview of how the housing of the two Roma communities was improved without reliance on financial or public institutions -- a context established in the previous. Second, the logics of the housing production in these two cases will be clarified by exposing the mobile earning strategies that have developed in recent decades. Within unusual and somewhat informal conditions, the Ludar and Rudari cases illustrate how effective resistance to hostile societies and welfare retrenchment can materialise housing contexts that are not only adequate in quality, but are also adaptive to new realities, such as expanding family structures. These stories thus demonstrate how Roma communities deal with what [@b0335] calls 'evictability'. This concept defines the possibility of being removed from a sheltering place or thwarted in (informal) economic activities and, as a result, being forced to extend the scope of mobile earning strategies and migration patterns. The stories provide a relational account between historical trajectories, materiality, and ongoing neglect and opposition of state policies.

4.1. From tents to *loteos populares* and from slums to houses {#s0045}
--------------------------------------------------------------

According to [@b0105], the Ludar are Rudari who escaped Southern Romania in the 19th century. [@b0010], [@b0065] have provided a possible historical explanation. They mention that a large number of Rudari moved to the Balkans after slavery was abolished in the Moldo--Wallachian principalities in 1864. In the Balkans, the Rudari were called *karavlaši* by the local people, which is Serbian for "Romanian Gypsies" (meaning literally "black Romanians"). Given that many of the Ludar have Serbo--Croatian surnames (e.g., Markovich, Stankovich, Mitrovich, and Nedich), it is likely that they first settled in Serbo--Croatian speaking parts of Austria--Hungary before moving on to the New World. [@b0105] also mentions this possibility when describing the migration of the Ludar to New York:"There first appear to have been Rom\[a\] from Austria--Hungary who landed at New York in 1881, followed by Ludar (Rudari) ... \[who\] were showmen, performers and animal trainers, and most arrived with their bears and monkeys."

The older Ludar I spoke with all remembered being born in tents and making a living from, for example, circus acts, fortune-telling, and street vending. They mentioned feeling rejected by larger society and saw no other way to survive than that of travelling about. This type of living was abruptly ended when, from the 1950s onwards, the Argentine government became increasingly hostile towards irregular movements. [@b0245] is convinced that Juan Perón ordered local police to force all Roma in Argentina to cease their nomadic lifestyle. This policy of forced sedentarisation culminated in 1973--1374 when Perón was in charge for the last time. He considered nomadism alien to Argentine society, and [@b0245] noted that awful and degrading police violence was responsible at that time for the arson of 100 Ludar tents, some even with people inside.

The persecution of the nomadic Ludar induced many of them to settle in a country where housing practices were increasingly racialised. The Ludar were not necessarily nomads because they were Roma but because of their poor economic situation and societal rejection. As a result, the initial move to regular housing was difficult. Most families adopted self-build strategies in *loteos populares* that were acquired from farmers and municipalities. Most of the Ludar found these *loteos* in GBAR. The narratives of how the first Ludar started to settle in the studied towns of La Perla and Moreno illustrate the strong kinship ties that helped them overcome dire poverty and the absence of state and welfare support. Certainly, not all Ludar were happy to give up their nomadic lifestyle, and some felt claustrophobic after moving into houses. However, most mentioned being ultimately happy to exchange nomadism for settled housing. An older Ludar woman, Sabina (71 years old), described the nomadic housing conditions:"It was unpleasant to sleep in a tent that often leaked -- all the mud on your feet. We smelled from the coal heaters, and that stench also made us hated in the city. I think we smelled very bad and they, the *Criollos*,[12](#fn12){ref-type="fn"} were constantly shouting: "dirty gypsies, dirty gypsies!" (June 2018)"

Acquiring land was costly, however. Some found ways to earn enough money from day labour and other typical Ludar work (e.g., street vending, taking tourist photos, and fortune-telling), while others had to sell their gold coins, many presumably brought from Europe. The *Ludărime*, the old nomadic camp, gradually became fixed in space. Once land was bought, the strategy of subdividing the lots was often used. Micea (82 years old) clarified this:"We stayed in tents until we made enough money from construction. So, there were some large landowners happy to sell us land, and we were allowed to subdivide these lots. We started constructing houses and as soon as they were finished, we informed our community leaders that more houses could be occupied. Once they were sold we could buy materials for our own house. (June 2018)."

The problem in the early period was that the sources of income were still the same as in previous nomadic times. Some of the Ludar found jobs in surrounding towns, but most interviewees I spoke with stressed that the 1970 s and 1980 s were particularly difficult: circuses were shut down; Argentineans increasingly owned cameras; and fortune-telling on the streets was not providing the same income as it once did. Moreover, many Ludar families converted in these years from Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to Pentecostalism, which meant that the women needed to foreswear "sorcery". Lastly, tents on owned plots were no longer tolerated, and municipal taxes needed to be paid once the *loteos populares* were included in the ever-expanding grid system of GBAR (cf. [@b0320]).

Nonetheless, housing quickly improved from the 1990s onwards. Although shantytowns mushroomed in GBAR, the Ludar instead inhabited well-built and spacious houses in La Perla and Moreno. Wood and mud were replaced by bricks. More lots of land were bought for children, and floors were added to the existing houses (see [Fig. 2](#f0010){ref-type="fig"} ).Fig. 2Liza's house in La Perla (source: author).

Little is written about the Rudari and even less about the villages in which they reside in Vâlcea County. Only [@b0045] briefly mentioned that, some fifty years ago, a community of Rudari was evicted by a local party secretary because they inhabited an area intended for new hotels. This story concerned the Rudari of Valea lui Stan, who in the state-socialist era were active in the collective farms (cf. [@b0350], on collectivisation). This lifestyle was remembered by some older Rudari interviewees as prosperous and secure. Not secure from farm relocations, but secure in that everyone was forced into employment and therefore not "dying of hunger like nowadays in democracy" [13](#fn13){ref-type="fn"} (interview with Filip, March 2018). According to older interviewees, the *miliția* (name of the police until 1989) never harassed them, but instead guarded their belongings whenever they were travelling through the county with merchandise and pitching tents for the night. Only when people refused to work were the *miliția* deemed merciless. The houses in those days were simple and built primarily from mud brick. Except for guaranteeing an income, the state did little. The houses were not connected to the gas or sewer mains and the roads were unpaved. Surely, some remembered to obtain building materials (such as tiles or window glass) through government programmes, but the Rudari were generally held responsible for constructing their own homes. None of the respondents remembered being invited to live in any of the newly built socialist residential areas in the nearby towns of Brezoi, Călimănești, or Râmnicu Vâlcea. As a result, by then their houses already looked poorer than those in the neighbouring non-Roma areas.

After 1989, the once-guaranteed jobs were replaced with irregular and underpaid day labour and state support was practically nonexistent or "too bureaucratic" ([@b0270]). "They \[i.e., municipal officials\] tell you to find a job when you ask for help", Tiberius said (interview, May 2016), when I asked him about social benefits. Consequently, a racialised image of the idle Rudari, accepting slum-like housing conditions, was reproduced in the postsocialist period. In reality, however, many Rudari had no income with which to improve their already dilapidated houses, and nearby employment possibilities were simply nonexistent. The housing conditions further deteriorated and overcrowding was a reality for most Rudari I spoke with (see [Fig. 3](#f0015){ref-type="fig"} ).Fig. 3Some of the poorest households in Valea lui Stan (source: author).

Nonetheless, over the past decade new houses have been constructed in all visited villages. The investments made by the Rudari are gradual and often interrupted by insufficient funds. Tiberius described this slow process:"First you buy BCA bricks \[see [Fig. 4](#f0020){ref-type="fig"}, left\]. They cost some RON 500 \[i.e., EUR 105\] per pallet. Then it's a matter of finding the right people to lay the bricks. Some in our village can do this, and they help us for free or for low compensation. The really difficult task is to find specialised people from the town \[i.e., Râmnicu Vâlcea\] or nearby villages to install new foundations and roofing. (interview, May 2016)"

Several other respondents specified that they needed to save around EUR 4000--5000 to finance a new house. Those who did not succeed in making such large investments instead chose to add additional rooms to existing dwellings (see [Fig. 4](#f0020){ref-type="fig"} , right). The Rudari communities in Romania claim that in recent decades nothing has truly changed in their living conditions. In most cases, the conditions have even worsened because of ongoing degradation of the houses or evictions from land they did not own. Only with Romania's accession to the EU did more money start to flow into the Rudari community -- not European development funds, but money generated by inventive earning strategies.Fig. 4Left: new bricks on pallets. Right: newly built addition, financed by begged money (source: author).

4.2. Developing earning strategies in hostile borderscapes {#s0050}
----------------------------------------------------------

To understand the gradual housing improvements, it is essential to examine the strategies and adaptations for dealing with changing borderscapes ([@b0315]). As the previous section pointed out, there has been a continuous "housing recalibration" ([@b0055], [@b0295]) in the studied communities. This realm of makeshift urbanisation is largely the outcome of a dire starting-point and ever-changing economic and socio-political challenges. In the context of Argentina's turbulent 1970 s, when most Ludar had already moved into houses, the Ludar continued being racialised as shady hustlers by the *Criollos*. The repressive societal imposition of Western norms forced the Ludar to accept a sedentary lifestyle, but this new lifestyle kept them poor and in substandard housing conditions for years. Their strategies in Argentina's increasingly repressive cat-and-mouse-geographies ([@b0220]) were essential in securing income. According to Sabina, fortune-telling and panhandling on the streets were greatly repressed "when the military came into power" (1976--1983). Moreover, various laws were adopted in following years that explicitly forbade street vending or fortune-telling (e.g., Law 41084/CD/1985). Liza even mentioned that their circus animals (e.g., bears, lions, and monkeys) were confiscated in 1981 after neighbouring Argentine farmers "blamed us for their cows being eaten up by our bears and lions -- but that was a lie!" (interview, June 2018). The circus animals were subsequently accommodated in the zoo of La Plata. The Ludar tourist photographers were also opposed and their ponies (intended for photos) were often not tolerated in the streets and parks of GBAR. These examples illustrate the economic impacts of the everyday bordering techniques in those days. In the European melting pot (*crisol de razas*) that Argentine society was supposed to represent (see [@b0025], [@b0155]), no place was reserved for "deviant" European elements.

For the Ludar to overcome this precarious and oppressive context, and not to fall victim to Argentina's housing crisis, they knew they needed to adapt. One way to do so was to adopt Western clothing so as not to raise suspicion. Miha (interview, May 2018) cited an example of how, by the 1970s, the Ludar had dealt with racialised images of the Roma in Argentina:"We stopped dressing like gypsies and started dressing like them \[i.e., the Argentines\] ... Our women stopped wearing skirts, otherwise they were spit at, beaten up by policemen, or insulted ... We also stopped talking *ludărește* when out because the *Criollos* didn't like to hear it."

One may wonder why most did not search for jobs in the local labour markets. Many tried, and some even succeeded in finding jobs, but even so, they complained about low salaries and precarious working conditions that jeopardised their claim on decent housing. As mentioned, tents on *loteos* were after a while no longer tolerated and needed to evolve in "regular" homes. Therefore, "the Ludar generally felt that it might be worse to participate in majority society", Jorge Nedich explained to me (interview, May 2018). The Ludar instead developed new earning strategies through which they could turn the racialised, hostile, and economically unstable situation ([@b0220]) in Argentina into what [@b0315] would call "a source of collective livelihood improvement" (p. 126). The strategy that started developing in the 1980s began with the acquisition of old school buses, which allowed the Ludar to sell products across the country (see [Fig. 5](#f0025){ref-type="fig"} ). Most importantly, these buses allowed the Ludar to operate beyond the oppressive borderscapes of GBAR.Fig. 5A typical Ludar street in La Perla with Ludar-owned school buses (source: author).

"You see", Draiu explained during one of our lunches at his place in La Perla (August 2018),"in Buenos Aires and the Province \[of Buenos Aires\] we had to watch out for the aggressive *bujoi* \[i.e., policemen\]. In the north and in the frontier cities of Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia, no one cared about us. People were happy to get our cheap products. In the south, people and *bujoi* are even worse than here ... you feel more hatred ... It's perhaps not correct \[to sell products without paying taxes\], but we offer things cheaper, half the price, we even bring them to their doorstep. Those people there are poor, poorer than here, and so happy with us ... Also, it's easier there to negotiate with *bujoi* ... they allow much more."

This adaptive power let the Ludar transcend the everyday bordering and the hegemonic and dehumanising cultural norms of Buenos Aires, allowing them to earn money in places from which, ironically enough, most recent immigration to Argentina's capital originates. Moreover, they go to places, particularly in the north, where they are no longer "gypsies" but traders from Buenos Aires. When the Ludar leave for work, they sometimes stay away for over six months, making agreements with other Ludar about the regions where and periods when they will sell. Another interesting aspect is that the Ludar cooperate in acquiring their goods in larger quantities and can therefore sell below market prices. Some families even specialise in wholesale for other Ludar merchants.

When I asked them about the resurgent oppression of street vendors and Macri's calls for increased law enforcement, most replied with resignation to possible new cat-and-mouse situations. "There is nothing new about this", Miha said, continuing, "we'll always find a way -- we know every street and road of this country, and if we need to change we'll do so".

The Rudari from Vâlcea County also need to navigate a borderscape of legal restrictions and everyday racism in order to escape poverty and address some of the toughest realities of Romania's housing crisis. In most interviews, I discovered a clear narrative of the racism faced in Romania. The everyday racist practices in Romania remind the Rudari they are inferior in the eyes of the majority non-Roma population. The following fragment from an interview with Andreea (February 2016) illustrates this point:"Me: Have you ever had problems with discrimination or racism \[in Romania\]?Andreea: No, I haven't had any.Me: Nobody ever cursed at you, or called you "*cioară*"[14](#fn14){ref-type="fn"} or the like?Andreea: Ah, this already started at school \[Note: Maria laughs\]. We're already called "*cioară*" and "*țigan*" at school in Romania. But this doesn't disturb me. Why would it? Brown bread is sweet, white bread is sour.Me: Have you ever wondered why you as Rudari live in poverty, while the Romanians have better living conditions?Andreea: I have wondered, but never found an answer.Me: Do you think it might be more difficult to find work because you are a Rudar?Andreea: Yes.Me: How did you discover this?Andreea: Well, someone wanted to give me some work for about four days, but he said he was afraid of me because I was a *țigan*."

Maria's story is important because it exposes the violent local everyday bordering in Romania that prevents the Rudari from actively participating in society. The support from local government, finding jobs, or being accepted in local community life are heavily restricted. This set of boundaries in turn reproduces the racialised image of idle and marginal Roma (cf. [@b0165], [@b0330]). Tiberius emphasised the impossibility of finding work: "I wouldn't even be ashamed to clean toilets. I would clean them by hand, no problem, if I could earn this money \[i.e., the amount of money he gets from begging in Sweden\]" (interview, March 2016). Some even claimed that no one would hire them because they had not finished secondary school, even when they applied for cleaning work. To overcome this impoverished and highly racist context, some ten years ago the Rudari started to organise adaptive support systems to help them travel abroad. In this system, for example, loans are offered for bus rides, family members arrange to stay behind to take care of children, and agreements are made about the places abroad where they will operate and sleep.

In Sweden, a first obvious border appears after 90 days, during which every EU non-resident is supposed to register. However, none of the people I spoke to was ever deported from Sweden. Nonetheless, without the right of residence, all were kept outside Sweden's labour market and they understood this. Therefore, the community support system once more proved vital to overcoming this form of bordering and to securing enough income. Various income-generating strategies were employed in addition to begging. Men usually search for returnable bottles during the day, and those who speak English try to obtain informal work (e.g., disposing of garbage or maintaining gardens) from restaurants or Swedish residents. In addition, on their travels, the Rudari bring along wood from Romania with which to handcraft various souvenirs for sale on the streets of Uppsala. The case of Emil illustrates that Sweden is only one stop on longer travels through Europe. When he travels to Sweden, he first stops in Germany and Denmark where he does seasonal work in agriculture, such as picking strawberries.

Homeless shelters are largely avoided because their cost (SEK 25 or EUR 2.50 per person) impedes the Rudari from succeeding in their two aims: sending regular remittances and saving money for housing construction in Romania. It can be argued that fees change these homeless shelters from being "welcoming" spaces into a deterrent and part of Sweden's everyday bordering. According to the research participants, if they are used and paid for, it becomes pointless to come to Sweden, especially because there are days when "you earn too little even to buy food" (interview with Ana, February 2016). Moreover, the homeless shelter in Uppsala charges per week, and that is an additional burden.

In response, most respondents preferred transgressive housing forms in Uppsala. To secure enough money to finance house construction in Romania, the Rudari are constantly negotiating their conditions of homelessness in Uppsala. They need to choose between central but highly visible spaces and remote, more hidden spots. Risk avoidance mechanisms play a vital role in being less 'evictable' ([@b0335]). One group I found lived in central Uppsala under a bridge, where they placed beds on both sides of the river (see [Fig. 6](#f0030){ref-type="fig"} ). They also had cooking facilities, and at its peak, some 50 Rudari lived at this site. Although the conditions were harsh, the place was convenient in that it also offered mutual support and companionship. However, the bridge was fenced off in March 2016 when, according to Tiberius, the developer of a new condominium project asked the police to evict them. After being warned, all the Rudari left the place and searched for new living sites.Fig. 6A previous Rudari shelter in Uppsala, below the Luthagen Bridge (source: author, photo taken February 2016).

This event affected the interviewed Rudari, who feared being imprisoned and, as a result, becoming incapable of sending remittances. Some made new shelters in forests outside Uppsala, where they were usually left alone but the daily commute to Uppsala became a new burden. They needed to take the train or bus into the city, but most did not for fear of being fined and potentially deported; instead, they walked at least two hours a day, were exhausted by night, and were increasingly afraid to "do things that attract attention", such as cooking, washing clothes, and spontaneously gathering. As long as they have no better prospects in Romania, they accept Uppsala's hardships and its everyday bordering: degrading comments from passers-by who disapprove of their presence, the harsh weather, and even the imminent threat of eviction.

In the final section, I will examine what derived from this experimental comparison. I will highlight the heterogenous outcomes of self-built and the variety in income strategies. The important resonance, however, is that many respondents expressed the conviction that within their communities they can increasingly feel at home. They can maintain their beloved traditions and culture without fear of being policed, evicted, or ridiculed. These small worlds have their own particularities and, yet, they resonate in a community-led urbanisation that is remarkably pervasive and global ([@b0055]).

5. Discussion: home-making practices compared {#s0055}
=============================================

The previous section presented two cases that illustrate how all the efforts of the Ludar and Rudari seem ultimately to come together in changes in their home communities. While slums and substandard housing are growing at staggering rates, many of the Ludar and some of the Rudari have managed to improve their housing. This study values the contextuality and difference in concrete local outcomes and identified how key processes shape local endeavours and precarity. These processes are not generalised but rather scrutinised in an attempt to learn about and ground the multiple ways in which precarity and exclusion are contested and unmade. The outcomes thus differ in, for example, housing quality or earning strategies and, yet, also mirror a relation between personal needs and aspirations and material outcomes. A further focus on resonances and differences will now be presented. I return to the key determinants that have guided the comparison: the role of the state, mobile earning strategies, and house- and home-making practices (see [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} ).Table 1Relationalities in housing and urban developments.ResonancesDifferencesRole of the State--State largely absent in providing affordable housing;--More freedom for self-built;--Common processes in curtailing unwanted movements.--Within the context of the EU, Rudari are much more targeted by securitisation processes.Earning strategies--Based on migratory processes;--Increased social mobility;--Based on strong community ties and solidarity.--The Ludar strategies have moved away from initial begging and entertainment activities;--Ludar rely largely on own properties and well-establish trade routes.Housing and homing practices--Unmaking precarity;--Gradual works;--Freedom to extend.--Ludar cultural consolidation, while the Rudari's culture was never threatened in the Carpathian villages;--Construction logics.

First, the roles of the state are comparable, in the sense that no noteworthy efforts are made to increase affordable housing. Argentina and Romania have largely given up their public housing efforts. As a result, many in these countries are forced to stand by themselves. Cities in Argentina and Romania have, on the one hand, undergone processes of social and spatial segregation and, on the other hand, this absent state role in providing public housing has proved a window of opportunity for some Roma to build according to their needs. In many developing and Eastern European countries, public housing might imply legal tenure rights and increased access to urban infrastructure. At the same time, it also often reproduces patterns of spatial and social segregation and forces families in small, poor quality dwellings that can no longer be transformed ([@b9015], [@b0035], [@b0055]). The loteos and small villages are also segregated. Yet, they provide freedom to reshape and extend houses. A clear distinction in the roles of the states is mirrored in the different opportunities for the studied groups, shaped by different borders. There are, as we could see, resonances between policies of migration prevention, or securitisation -- i.e. attempts to deter unwanted movements of people. However, with a closer eye to detail, we see that the Ludar are -- due to their increased mobility and longstanding experience -- less vulnerable to eviction. And still, they were also historically thwarted by the state and are still wary when carrying out their businesses.

This attention to bordering leads us to the second process: their agency clarifies how peripheral and substandard housing conditions can be altered by challenging complex borderscapes. Here, I have attempted to reflect critically on the thoughtlessness of state policies by highlighting the efficiency of the mobile earning strategies used by the two studied groups. These strategies have proven vital in improving housing and livelihood conditions -- sometimes slightly, sometimes greatly. The cases, thus, illustrate how strongly the racialised stereotypes are contradicted by the courageous and radical endeavours of these two groups. Although the racialisation of the Roma informs all the aspects of Roma agency, the contexts present different opportunities for the two groups. Identifying and understanding this local agency entails acknowledging the efforts, solidarity, and persistence in dealing with violence and hostility from majority society. The agency of the Rudari in Uppsala illustrates one outcome of the importance of solidarity. In their effort to avoid paying to stay in the homeless shelter, the Rudari withstand an environment in which everything reminds them they are unwelcome and not at home. In the homeless shelters, the alarms go off at 06:00, at 07:00 they must leave, and they are only welcomed back after 18:00. However dire their conditions, their makeshift shelters with their relative freedom embody daily efforts to resist as a community: people cook there, try to stay clean and make plans for better futures. The experience of the Ludar has already moved away from these very critical conditions. They provide advantageous loans to each other, help in financing new sidewalks and maintenance of the buses, and cooperate in keeping their culture alive. And yet, these examples do not represent the outcome of a linear process, they are some of the many trajectories that can productively undo marginalised conditions ([@b0185]).

This brings me to the final process; the house- and home-making practices. The material outcomes in the Argentinean case are undeniably of higher standard and also signify different logics. Through these houses and communities, Ludar resist the violence and persecution experienced in Argentina. By building such large houses, they uphold, for example, the old tradition of keeping their sons within the family's "tent camp" after they marry. By living concentrated as a group, they have changed local cultures in their neighbourhoods in their favour: the women can walk freely on the streets wearing colourful dresses; the non-Ludar neighbours no longer complain about horses on the streets; and in the local churches, their religious and cultural heritage is safeguarded. Baniel captured the situation perhaps best: "The *Criollos* are now the guests here and we are the hosts". The Rudari, instead, never left their impoverished living conditions and have only recently embarked on a slow process of upgrading their shanties into more adequate houses. Of the 78 interviewed Rudari households in Romania, 56 stated that at least one household member had already been abroad, and most of this group of 56 stated that the extra income had at least given them freedom from hunger. Moreover, five of the studied Rudari households managed to build houses from scratch, 16 built additional rooms, and eight repaired and renovated existing shanty dwellings. Also, five mentioned they were able to connect to electricity.

However, while these outcomes differ, their ambition resonates: all interviewees ultimately aspire to have "civilised" houses, that look like the ones inhabited by Romanians and the *Criollos*, and also to attain dignity within spaces, where they feel safe, respected, and at home.

Lastly, this study facilitates new understandings of how to deal with housing crises. The new *Ludărime* of La Perla and Moreno and the ongoing housing improvements in Vâlcea County illustrate migrants' effective responses to absent housing politics. If we understand their coping and livelihood strategies as a proposition, this proposition "does not require recognition from the outside to stand, because its truth and validity are self-grounded" ([@b0170]). The most meaningful approach instead entails recognising that the proposition *already* stands and that progress towards it has been and continues to be racialised and opposed. To level borderscapes and to acknowledge these groups' efforts as effective and rational strategies would be a second and essential step. After all, the presented strategies have engendered more wellbeing and progress than have all the ineffective government-led attempts to improve Roma housing and social inclusion.
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Note: "Roma" is a monolithic construct of an otherwise linguistically, religiously, and culturally heterogeneous group.

Statista: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/246355/home-ownership-rate-in-europe/>.

Hofinet: [http://hofinet.org/countries/country.aspx?regionID=4&id=8](http://hofinet.org/countries/country.aspx%3fregionID%3d4%26id%3d8){#ir010}.

This rise can, as The Guardian puts it, be understood in terms of increased electoral support for populist parties, participation of populist politicians in local and national governments, and the legitimacy of populist thinkers to interpret societal and political questions in the mass media.

Except in the province of Buenos Aires, where they come second behind "Muslims".

There is, nevertheless, a racist and stigmatising tone in reporting on crimes committed by Argentine Roma. Whenever a Roma commits a crime, Nedich argues in an opinion piece in *Página 12*, he or she is deemed a "member" of a "Roma Mafia" by politicians or the mass media.

On 15 March 2019, Macri gave a speech at a military academy in which he claimed that better-secured borders were vital to keeping out Mafiosi and protecting Argentineans (*La Nacion*).

Various Argentina news media (e.g., *Clarín* and *Infobae*) have reported that illegal residents will be deported. Likewise, residence permits obtained through the 2003 law can be cancelled when someone breaks the law.

This figure is an estimate from the Argentine Chamber of Commerce.

The inhabitants unofficially called their village "Răul Băieși" (River Boyash).

Gastón [@b0280] is one of the few who have written about this dialect of Romanian.

When Ludar refer to non-Roma Argentineans, they use the word *Criollo* or *Neamț*.

In everyday speech, "democracy" is used to denote the postsocialist period.

*Cioară* means crow in Romanian but is often used as a slur for Roma people.
